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SEAGATE EQUALS SEA CHANGE: THE FEDERAL
CIRCUIT ESTABLISHES A NEW TEST FOR
PROVING WILLFUL INFRINGEMENT AND
PRESERVES THE SANCTITY OF THE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
Brian Fergusont
Abstract
In a landmark decision, a unanimous Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit established a new, more stringent standard for
proving willful patent infringement and reaffirmed the sanctity of the
attorney-client privilege in our adversarial system of justice. The
case, In re Seagate Technology LLC, will have a profound effect on
future patent litigation, as a finding of willful infringement often leads
to an award of enhanced monetary damages to the patentee under 35
U.S.C. § 284. The decision also provides much needed clarity
concerning the scope of waiver of the attorney-client privilege when a
patent infringement defendant asserts the "advice of counsel" defense
to a charge of willful patent infringement.
f Mr. Ferguson is a partner in the law firm of McDermott Will & Emery LLP based in
the Finn's Washington, D.C. office. He serves as the firm-wide deputy head of the Intellectual
Property, Media & Technology Department. He represented Seagate Technology, LLC before
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
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I. WILLFUL INFRINGEMENT AND THE ADVICE OF COUNSEL
DEFENSE
Patent infringement is a form of strict liability tort; a defendant
may be found liable of patent infringement regardless of his motive or
intent.' However, the nature of a defendant's actions may be relevant
to the question of willful infringement.2 In the absence of any statute
defining what constitutes willful infringement, the courts historically
equated willful infringement with bad faith or wanton and malicious
conduct.3 A finding of willful infringement is significant because it
opens the door to the possibility of the patentee being awarded
enhanced damages pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 284. 4 While the statute is
silent as to what justifies an award of enhanced damages, the Federal
Circuit has long held that an award of enhanced damages generally
requires a showing of willful infringement.
5
Prior to the formation of the Federal Circuit, a "widespread
disregard of patent rights was undermining the national innovation
incentive. ' '6  This widespread disregard was contrary to the
1. See, e.g., In re Seagate Tech., LLC, No. 830, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 19768, at *12
(Fed. Cir. Aug. 20, 2007) (en bane) ("Because patent infringement is a strict liability offense,
the nature of the offense is only relevant in determining whether enhanced damages are
warranted."); Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Wamer-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1523 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (en bane) (per curium) ("Accidental or 'innocent' infringement is still infringement."),
rev'd on other grounds, 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
2. Seagate, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 19768, at *12.
3. See, e.g., Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1570-71 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (noting that
bad faith infringement is a type of willful infringement); Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top
Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 508 (1961) (noting that a party can recover punitive or
"increased" damages for willful or bad faith infringement); Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. (16
How.) 480, 488 (1853) ("It is true, where the injury is wanton or malicious, a jury may inflict
vindictive or exemplary damages, not to recompense the plaintiff, but to punish the defendant.").
4. The current version of section 284 provides in relevant part that "the court may
increase the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed." 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000).
The courts have had such discretion since 1836. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 14, 5 Stat. 117,
123 (1836) ("[I]t shall be in the power of the court to render judgment for any sum above the
amount found by such verdict ... not exceeding three times the amount thereof, according to the
circumstances of the case ... ").
5. See Beatrice Foods Co. v. New England Printing & Lithographing Co., 923 F.2d
1576, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1991). But see Judge Gajarsa's concurring opinion in Seagate, advocating
the elimination of "the grafting of willfulness onto section 284." Seagate, 2007 U.S. App.
LEXIS 19768, at *38 (Gajarsa, J., concurring). In Judge Gajarsa's view, enhanced damages
should not be limited to instances of willfulness, but left to the discretion of the trial judge based
on the circumstances of each case. Id.
6. See Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahreuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337,
1343 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en bane) (citing Advisory Committee on Industrial Innovation, Final
Report, Dep't of Commerce (Sept. 1979)).
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Constitution, which empowered Congress "To promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.",7 The judicial system's inability or refusal to enforce
patent rights was seen as a disincentive to scientists to continue to
innovate, as unscrupulous infringers were allowed to take advantage
of the fruits of the inventors' labor without any adverse
consequences. 8 This was the legal landscape of patent law when the
Federal Circuit came into being on October 1, 1982. 9
One of the Federal Circuit's purposes was to promote greater
uniformity in the area of patent law. 10 One of its early efforts in this
regard was the Underwater Devices case." In that case, the court was
confronted with a fact pattern typical of the time: a competitor of the
patentee was essentially told by its attorney that it should not be
overly concerned regarding its competitor's patent rights because
"[c]ourts, in recent years, have-in patent infringement cases-found
[asserted patents] invalid in approximately 80% of the cases."' 12 The
attorney thus concluded that it was unlikely his client would ever be
sued for patent infringement.'
3
The Federal Circuit did not approve of such "willful disregard"
for the patent rights of others. 14 It thus established the modem test for
determining willful infringement: "where ... a potential infringer has
actual notice of another's patent rights, he has an affirmative duty to
exercise due care to determine whether or not he is infringing."'' 5 This
"duty of due care standard" reflected the fact that "patent property
should receive the same respect that the law imposes on all property.
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
8. See, Fromson v. Western Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1574-75 (Fed.
Cir. 1988) (noting that the courts' historical refusal to grant injunctions to individual patentees
resulted "in a lowered respect for the rights of such patentees and a failure to recognize the
innovation-encouraging social purpose of the patent system. ... That 'survival of the fittest'
jungle mentality was intended to be replaced, not served, by the law.").
9. The court was enacted as part of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub.
L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982). See also South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370
(Fed. Cir. 1982) (holding that the holdings of the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals, announced before the close of business on September 30, 1982, would be
binding on the Federal Circuit as precedent).
10. See Manildra Milling Corp. v. Ogilvie Mills, Inc., 76 F.3d 1178, 1181 (Fed. Cir.
1996).
11. Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
12. Id. at 1385.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1390.
15. Id. at 1389.
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Industrial innovation would falter without the order that patent
property contributes to the complexities of investment in technologic
R&D and commercialization in a competitive marketplace."'
' 6
As expressed in Underwater Devices, the duty of due care
included "the duty to seek and obtain competent legal advice from
counsel before the initiation of any possible infringing activity."' 7
This resulted in the "advice of counsel defense" to a charge of willful
infringement. "Under this defense, an accused willful infringer aims
to establish that due to reasonable reliance on advice from counsel, its
continued accused activities were done in good faith. Typically,
counsel's opinion concludes that the patent is invalid, unenforceable,
and/or not infringed."'
18
As implemented, the duty of due care standard effectively
resulted in a defacto requirement that a defendant accused of willful
infringement must produce an opinion of counsel in defense to the
claim. 19 This was especially the case prior to 2004, when the law
imposed an "adverse inference" on defendants who failed to produce
an opinion of counsel in defense to a willfulness charge: "[A
defendant's] silence on the subject, in alleged reliance on the
attorney-client privilege, would warrant the conclusion that it either
obtained no advice of counsel or did so and was advised that its
[activities] would be an infringement of valid U.S. patents., 20
In the face of the duty of due care standard and the adverse
inference, patent defendants routinely obtained, and then produced
during litigation, opinions of counsel as part of the advice of counsel
defense to a willful infringement claim.21 This practice resulted in
numerous complications for courts and defendants alike. First,
reliance on an advice of counsel defense results in waiver of the
16. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, No. 830, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 19768, at *62 (Fed. Cir.
Aug. 20, 2007) (Newman, J. concurring).
17. Underwater Devices, 717 F.2d at 1390 (emphasis in original).
18. Seagate, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 19768, at *16.
19. In Seagate, the Federal Circuit acknowledged this de facto requirement stemming
from the Underwater Devices decision: "Although an infringer's reliance on favorable advice of
counsel, or conversely his failure to proffer any favorable advice, is not dispositive of the
willfulness inquiry, it is crucial to the analysis." Seagate, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 19768, at *16
(emphasis added).
20. Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible Inc., 793 F.2d 1565, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1986). See
also Electro Med. Sys., S.A. v. Cooper Life Scis., Inc., 34 F.3d 1048, 1057 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
("The district court here was free to draw an inference adverse to [Plaintiff] when, asserting the
attorney-client privilege, [Plaintiff] refused to produce an opinion of counsel.").
21. Seagate, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 19768, at *16 ("In light of the duty of due care,
accused willful infringers commonly assert an advice of counsel of defense.").
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attorney-client privilege. This was a serious concern, as "[t]he
attorney-client privilege rests at the center of our adversary system
and promotes 'broader public interests in the observance of law and
administration of justice' and 'encourages full and frank
communication between attorneys and their clients.' ' 22 Given the
importance of the attorney-client privilege to the effective
administration of the adversarial system, it is little wonder the courts
would interpret the scope of any waiver narrowly.23 The Federal
Circuit recognized the tension between the duty of due care standard
and the importance of the attorney-client privilege in 1991:
Proper resolution of the dilemma of an accused infringer who
must choose between the lawful assertion of the attorney-client
privilege and avoidance of a willfulness finding if infringement is
found, is of great importance not only to the parties but to the
fundamental values sought to be preserved by the attorney-client
privilege.
24
Waiving the attorney-client privilege in the hope of insulating a
defendant from a finding of willful infringement allows the patentee
insights into possible weaknesses in the defendant's case concerning
the underlying issues on the merits-infringement and validity.25
Second, the question of whether a defendant would rely on the
advice of counsel defense, and the associated questions regarding the
scope of any resulting waiver of privilege, resulted in the courts and
parties having to engage in extensive and expensive satellite litigation
22. United States v. Philip Morris, Inc., 314 F.3d 612, 618 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)).
23. See, e.g., In re Lott, 424 F.3d 446, 453 (6th Cir. 2005) ("Courts 'must impose a
waiver no broader than needed to ensure the fairness of the proceedings before it.'... 'A broad
waiver would no doubt inhibit the kind of frank attorney-client communications and vigorous
investigation of all possible defenses that the attorney-client and work product privileges are
designed to promote."'(quoting Bittaker v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715, 720, 722 (9th Cir. 2003)
(en banc))); Bittaker, 331 F.3d at 720 ("Courts, including ours, that have imposed waivers under
the fairness principle have therefore closely tailored the scope of the waiver to the needs of the
opposing party in litigating the claim in question."). As the Sixth Circuit recognized in Lott, a
narrow interpretation of the waiver is required, because "if we eat away at the privilege by
expanding the fiction of waiver, pretty soon there will be little left of the privilege." In re Lott,
424 F.3d at 451.
24. Quantum Corp. v. Tandon Corp., 940 F.2d 642, 643 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
25.
An accused infringer, therefore, should not, without the trial court's careful
consideration, be forced to choose between waiving the privilege in order to
protect itself from a willfulness finding, in which case it may risk prejudicing
itself on the question of liability, and maintaining the privilege, in which case it
may risk being found to be a willful infringer if liability is found.
Id. at 643-44.
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before the actual trial on questions of validity and infringement. This
was eloquently explained by then-district court judge Roderick
McKelvie in 1995:
[T]hese decisions [Underwater Devices and Kloster] have changed
how patent cases are litigated. The current convention in patent
litigation strategy is as follows: the patent owner opens with a
claim for willful infringement; the alleged infringer answers by
denying willful infringement and asserts good faith reliance on
advice of counsel as an affirmative defense; then the owner
serves contention interrogatories and document requests seeking
the factual basis for that good faith reliance defense and the
production of documents relating to counsel's opinion; the alleged
infringer responds by seeking to defer responses and a decision on
disclosure of the opinion; the owner counters by moving to
compel; and the alleged infringer moves to stay discovery and for
separate trials. In this case, the parties have played out their moves.
Now it is the court's turn to join in.26
Judge McKelvie further recognized the potential prejudice a
defendant faced by having to make the decision whether to assert the
advice of counsel defense to a charge of willfulness before the
patentee had established liability on the underlying merits;
nonetheless, the Federal Circuit's precedent left no other option.27
Third, another unappealing result of the application of the duty
of due care standard was the rise of so-called "window-dressing"
opinions. Companies obtained such opinions not for the purpose of
making informed business decisions, but solely for protection from a
willful infringement claim in any litigation concerning the patents in
question. 28 This unnecessarily added to the already expensive cost of
patent litigation.
26. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, 160 F.R.D. 30, 34 (D. Del. 1995).
27.
[Defendant] is correct that moving forward with discovery will subject it to the
harm of having to disclose the advice of counsel before it has been found liable to
the plaintiffs. That is the natural consequence of the Federal Circuit's decisions
that suggest an alleged infringer must respond to a claim of willful infringement
by disclosing the advice of counsel or face a negative inference for invoking the
attorney-client privilege.
Id. at 36.
28. See, e.g., Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Cellpro, 978 F. Supp. 184, 193 (D. Del. 1997), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 152 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The court stated that the opinions in
question
were so obviously deficient, one might expect a juror to conclude the only value
they had to [Defendant] in the world outside the courtroom would have been to
file them in a drawer until they could be used in a cynical effort to try to confuse
[Vol. 24
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But perhaps the most alarming consequence of the duty of due
care standard was that it had facilitated "opportunities for abusive
gamesmanship" by certain patentees. 29 In many instances, patent-
holders would send a copy of the patent in question to large numbers
of potential defendants and demand the companies buy a license to
the patent without providing any analysis or other rationale. This
resulting "knowledge" of the patentee's rights, satisfying the notice
requirement, exposed the recipients to an increased threat of willful
infringement under the duty of due care standard, even when the
companies were provided no real basis for believing they were
infringing the patent in question. Many companies viewed the risk of
treble damages in a later litigation as unacceptable, and would agree
to pay the patentee for a license that they arguably did not need.
This unintended result of the duty of due care standard was
brought to the forefront in 2003, when the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) reported that companies were wary of investigating what
patents existed in their industries, for fear of later being charged with
willfully infringing those patents.30 The FTC concluded that this fear
stifled, rather than encouraged, innovation. 31 Thus, the threat to
innovation - the underlying goal of the patent system - had come full
circle since the Department of Commerce's 1979 report cited by the
Federal Circuit in Knorre-Bremse.
32
The Federal Circuit took its first major step toward reversing the
impact of the duty of due care standard with the 2004 en banc
Knorre-Bremse decision. There, the court recognized that the adverse
inference imposed "inappropriate burdens on the attorney-client
or mislead what [Defendant], its Board, and counsel must have expected would
be an unsophisticated jury.
See also Scott Paper Co. v. Moore Bus. Forms, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 1051, 1085 (D. Del. 1984)
("[T]he opinions of counsel were nothing more than window dressing .... "); Knorre-Bremse
Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Dyk,
J. concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part) (stating that the duty of due care standard has
resulted in "a cottage industry of window-dressing legal opinions by third party counsel
designed to protect the real decision-making process between litigating counsel and the
company's executives").
29. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, No. 830, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 19768, at *62 (Fed. Cir.
Aug. 20, 2007) (Newman, J. concurring).
30. FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, ch. 5, at 29 (2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf.
31. Id., ch. 5, at 30-32.
32. Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1343 (citing Advisory Committee on Industrial
Innovation, Final Report, Dep't of Commerce (Sept. 1979)).
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relationship" 33 and held that maintaining the attorney-client privilege
for opinions of counsel would not give rise to an adverse inference.34
The court also stated that an accused infringer's failure to obtain legal
advice would likewise not give rise to an adverse inference.35
However, with the duty of due care standard still requiring "the duty
to seek and obtain competent legal advice from counsel, 36 few
companies felt comfortable foregoing obtaining opinions of counsel.
Thus, issues regarding the timing of the production of opinions, and
the attendant scope of the attorney-client privilege waiver, still
existed.
In addition, the district courts continued to struggle with the
question of the scope of the waiver. While it had long been the rule
that if a defendant chose to rely on the advice of counsel in defense to
a willfulness claim, where the associated waiver would extend to all
communications with counsel who provided such advice, 37 it was far
from clear whether the waiver should extend to communications on
the same subject matter with other attorneys, particularly those with
defendants' trial counsel. District courts reached various results in
addressing this question. Some extended waiver to communications
with trial counsel, while others declined to do so, and still others
looked for a middle-ground approach.38
Further confusing the matter was the Federal Circuit's 2006
EchoStar decision. 39 There, the court affirmed a lower court's holding
that there should be no distinction between in-house counsel who
provides advice concerning patents and outside counsel; the waiver
rules were the same. 40 The court also stated the following:
33. Id. at 1343.
34. Id. at 1344-45.
35. Id. at 1345-46.
36. Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1390 (Fed. Cir.
1983).
37. "[T]he voluntary waiver by a client, without limitation, of one or more privileged
documents passing between a certain attorney and the client discussing a certain subject waives
the privilege as to all communications between the same attorney and the same client on the
same subject." Hercules Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 156 (D. Del. 1977) (emphasis
added); see also Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1161 (D.S.C.
1975).
38. See In re Seagate Tech., LLC, No. 830, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 19768, at *26-27
(collecting cases).
39. In re EchoStar Commc'ns Corp., 448 F.3d 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
40. Id. at 1299 ("[W]hen [Defendant] chose to rely on the advice of in-house counsel, it
waived the attorney-client privilege with regard to any attorney-client communications relating
to the same subject matter, including communications with counsel other than in-house
counsel").
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Once a party announces that it will rely on advice of counsel,
for example, in response to an assertion of willful infringement, the
attorney-client privilege is waived. "The widely applied standard
for determining the scope of a waiver of attorney-client privilege is
that the waiver applies to all other communications relating to the
same subject matter., 4 1
While EchoStar did not concern trial counsel, the above language
nevertheless resulted in some district courts extending the scope of
the waiver to communications with trial counsel.4 2 With the district
courts issuing widely varying answers to this question concerning the
scope of the waiver, the patent bar was badly in need of guidance
from the Federal Circuit.
43
II. THE SEAGATECASE
In July 2000, Seagate Technology LLC ("Seagate") 44 was sued
for patent infringement in the Southern District of New York. Prior to
the lawsuit, Seagate had retained opinion counsel to provide advice
regarding the patents in question. Seagate also retained trial counsel,
and Seagate's opinion and trial counsel were kept separate and
distinct at all times.45
With the case progressing in the pre-Knorre-Bremse era, Seagate
chose to rely on the advice of counsel defense to the patentee's claim
of willful infringement. Seagate produced the noninfringement
opinions from its opinion counsel, and depositions of Seagate's
decision-makers and the opinion counsel were taken. The patentee
thereafter moved to compel discovery of all communications and
work product of Seagate's other counsel, including trial counsel. In
May 2004, a magistrate judge agreed with the patentee that Seagate's
41. Id. (quoting Fort James Corp. v. Solo Cup Co., 412 F.3d 1340, 1349 (Fed. Cir.
2005)).
42. See, e.g., Informatica Corp. v. Bus. Objects Data Integration, Inc., 454 F. Supp.2d
957, 959 (N.D. Cal. July 14, 2006) (magistrate opinion), aff'd, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58976
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2006); Iridex Corp. v. Synergetics, Inc., No. 4:05CV1916 CDP, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 7747, at *2-3 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 2, 2007).
43. "An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in widely
varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at all." Upjohn Co. v. United
States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981).
44. Seagate is one of the world's leaders in the development and marketing of computer
disk drives. See http://www.seagate.com.
45. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, No. 830, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 19768, at *7-8 ("There is
no dispute that Seagate's opinion counsel operated separately and independently of trial counsel
at all times.").
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waiver extended to communications with trial counsel. 46 Seagate filed
objections with the district court, which were denied by the district
court in July 2006. After Seagate unsuccessfully requested that the
district court certify its discovery orders for interlocutory appeal
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), Seagate filed a petition for a writ of
mandamus ("petition") with the Federal Circuit on September 29,
2006. On that same day, the Federal Circuit stayed the district court's
discovery orders while it considered the merits of Seagate's petition.
On January 26, 2007, the Federal Circuit issued an order sua
sponte to hear Seagate's petition en bane.47 As part of that order, the
court asked the parties to address the following three questions:
1. Should a party's assertion of the advice of counsel defense to
willful infringement extend waiver of the attorney-client privilege
to communications with that party's trial counsel? See In re
EchoStar Comme 'n Corp., 448 F.3d 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
2. What is the effect of any such waiver on work-product
immunity?
3. Given the impact of the statutory duty of due care standard
announced in Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co.,
717 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983), on the issue of waiver of attorney-
client privilege, should this court reconsider the decision in
Underwater Devices and the duty of care standard itself?
48
The parties thereafter briefed the three issues, and the Federal
Circuit heard oral argument on June 7, 2007. On August 20, 2007, the
court handed down its unanimous ruling.
III. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S SEAGATE DECISION
A. A New Standard for Proving Willful Infringement
The court first addressed the question concerning the duty of due
care standard. The court noted that the term "willful" is not unique to
patent law, but has a well-established meaning in the civil context.49
Citing to decisions in the copyright infringement realm, the court
pointed out that a finding of willful copyright infringement requires
46. See Convolve, Inc. v. Compaq Computer Corp., 224 F.R.D. 98, 105, 107 (S.D.N.Y.
2004).
47. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 214 Fed. Appx. 997 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (per curium).
48. Id.
49. Seagate, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 19768, at *19.
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reckless behavior.50 The court also relied on a recent Supreme Court
case addressing willful violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act,
where the Supreme Court held that the "standard civil usage" of
"willful" required "reckless behavior.",5 1
The duty of due care standard, in contrast, did not require such
reckless behavior. Rather, it "sets a lower threshold for willful
infringement that is more akin to negligence. This standard fails to
comport with the general understanding of willfulness in the civil
context., 52 Therefore, the court concluded that the current duty of due
care standard would allow for punitive damages to be assessed for
merely negligent acts, in a manner inconsistent with Supreme Court
precedent:
Accordingly, we overrule the standard set out in Underwater
Devices and hold that proof of willful infringement permitting
enhanced damages requires at least a showing of objective
recklessness. Because we abandon the duty of due care, we also
reemphasize that there is no affirmative obligation to obtain
opinion of counsel.
53
The court also set forth a new, two-part test for determining
whether willful infringement had occurred. First, a patentee must
show by clear and convincing evidence that the infringer acted despite
an objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted infringement
of a valid patent.54 Of particular note, "the state of mind of the
accused infringer is not relevant to this objective inquiry. ' 55
Second, if the threshold objective standard is met, the patentee
must also demonstrate that this objectively-defined risk (determined
by the record developed in the infringement proceeding) was either
known or so obvious that it should have been known to the accused
infringer.56 In other words, not only must the patentee show that the
defendant was objectively reckless in its conduct, it must also show
that the defendant either knew it was acting recklessly, or clearly
should have known its actions were reckless.
50. Id. at *19-20 (citing, inter alia, Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 112
(2d Cir. 2001)).
51. Id. at *20-21 (citing Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 127 S. Ct. 2201 (2007)).
52. Id. at *21-22 (citing McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 132-33
(1988)).
53. Id. at *22.
54. Id. at *22-23.
55. Id. at *23.
56. Id.
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B. Waiver Does not Extend to Communications with Trial
Counsel
Turning to the question of the scope of any associated waiver of
the attorney-client privilege, the court found persuasive Seagate's
argument that opinion counsel and trial counsel perform significantly
different functions:
Whereas opinion counsel serves to provide an objective assessment
for making informed business decisions, trial counsel focuses on
litigation strategy and evaluates the most successful manner of
presenting a case to a judicial decision maker. And trial counsel is
engaged in an adversarial process .... Therefore, fairness counsels
against disclosing trial counsel's communications on an entire
subject matter in response to an accused infringer's reliance on
opinion counsel's opinion to refute a willfulness allegation.
57
The court also reaffirmed the importance of maintaining the
confidentiality of trial counsel's thought process, stating that the
"demands of our adversarial system of justice will far outweigh any
benefits of extending waiver to trial counsel. ' 58 The court thus held,
as general proposition, that "asserting the advice of counsel defense
and disclosing opinions of opinion counsel do not constitute waiver of
the attorney-client privilege for communications with trial counsel."59
C. Waiver Does not Extend to Trial Counsel's Work Product
For similar reasons, the court held that "relying on opinion
counsel's work product does not waive work product immunity with
respect to trial counsel. 6 ° While the court distinguished between
"tangible work product," which is addressed in Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(3), 61 and "non-tangible work product," wherein courts continue
57. Id. at *27-28. The court cited to its Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. TriTech
Microelectronics Int'l, Inc. opinion where it previously recognized that "defenses prepared [by
litigation counsel] for a trial are not equivalent to the competent legal opinion of non-
infringement or invalidity which qualify as 'due care' before undertaking any potentially
infringing activity." Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. TriTech Microelectronics Int ', Inc., 246
F.3d 1336, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
58. Seagate, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 19768, at *28-29 (citing, inter alia, Hickman v.
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), and Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996)).
59. Id. at *32. The court qualified this holding by noting that trial courts could, in unique
situations, extend waiver to trial counsel, such as if a party or counsel engages in "chicanery."
Id.
60. Id. at *36. The court again qualified this holding, should a trial court determine that
the defendant or its counsel engaged in "chicanery." Id.
61. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) provides in pertinent part:
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to apply the Supreme Court's Hickman v. Taylor decision, its decision
was the same for both. The court noted that the distinction was
relevant because the patentee in the Seagate case sought to depose
Seagate's trial counsel: "we agree that work product protection
remains available to 'nontangible' work product under Hickman.
Otherwise, attorneys' files would be protected from discovery, but
attorneys themselves would have no work product objection to
depositions. 6 2 The court thus granted Seagate's petition and
remanded to the district court in order to reconsider its discovery
orders in light of the opinion.63
IV. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S DECISIONS WERE THE RIGHT ONES
The Federal Circuit's decision was welcome and needed. With
respect to the standard for proving willfulness, Judge Dyk had
previously pointed out, in his concurring and dissenting opinion in
Knorr-Bremse, that the duty of due care standard neither conformed
to other areas of the law that defined "willful" behavior,64 nor was it
of any recent benefit to the patent system. 65 The court's new
"objectively reckless" standard brings this area of the patent law in
line with Supreme Court precedent, and places the burden of proving
willful infringement back on the patentee. As to the first point, as the
court stated, the Supreme Court defines willful conduct in the context
of its "standard civil usage," i.e., reckless behavior and/or reckless
disregard of the law. Second, since the Underwater Devices decision,
a de facto requirement that a defendant obtain an opinion of counsel
once it had notice of a patent effectively turned the patentee's burden
of proving willful infringement into a presumption of willfulness that
required rebuttal by defendants. By restoring the burden to prove
[A] party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise
discoverable under subdivision (b)(l) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of
litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's
representative (including the other party's attorney, consultant, surety,
indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that the party seeking
discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the party's
case and that the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial
equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering discovery of such
materials when the required showing has been made, the court shall protect
against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal
theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation.
62. Seagate, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 19768, at *37.
63. Id. at *37-38.
64. Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahreuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337,
1348-51 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Dyk, J., concurring-in-part, dissenting-in-part).
65. Id. at 1351-52.
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willful infringement on the patentee, and clarifying that there is "no
affirmative obligation" to obtain an opinion of counsel, the court's
decision brings the focus in patent cases back to the underlying merits
- infringement and validity - and not the willfulness/attorney-client
privilege waiver sideshow into which too many cases devolve.
Further, the decision motivates organizations involved in research and
development to explore technological advances more freely, with the
resulting benefit being increased innovation and product
development.
As to the scope of waiver issues, the court, in its analysis,
balanced the patentee's need for trial counsel's communications with
the defendant's right to full and frank advice from its attorneys, and
correctly concluded the latter far outweighed the former. Prior to the
court's decision, the uncertainty surrounding the scope of the waiver
left accused infringers with a Hobson's choice between relying on the
advice of counsel defense to a charge of willful infringement, and
losing the right to communicate openly with trial counsel. In many
cases where the district court extended waiver to trial counsel, the
defendant's litigation strategy was exposed to its adversary. In such
cases, merely alleging willfulness would have ensured the patentee
access to strategic communications between trial counsel and its
client with respect to the ultimate issues in the case: infringement,
invalidity, and unenforceability. This turned the question of
willfulness of the infringement, rather than infringement itself, into
the paramount issue in the case - a consequence the law never
intended. The court's decision eliminates this dilemma and recognizes
the different roles played by opinion counsel and trial counsel in a
patent case. The court's decision further instills confidence in the
patent bar by confirming the sanctity and vital importance of the
attorney-client privilege and the work product immunity doctrine.
V. THE SEAGATE DECISION'S IMPACT ON FUTURE PATENT
LITIGATION
The Seagate decision provides broad rules of law but leaves it to
future cases to develop the application of the new willfulness
standard.66 Provided below is a brief overview of two questions that
will undoubtedly arise in the wake of the decision.
66. Seagate, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 19768, at *23.
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A. Are Opinions of Counsel a Thing of the Past?
The short answer is "no." While the new willfulness standard
undoubtedly makes it harder to prove willful infringement, until the
courts sort out exactly what type of conduct is "objectively reckless,"
it will still be prudent, at least in certain situations, to obtain opinions
of counsel.
For example, contrast the situation where a patentee sends a
letter that explains in detail why the patentee believes the target
company needs a license, identifying specific products and including
claim charts and other analysis, with the situation where the patentee
merely sends a letter enclosing the patent with no in-depth analysis. In
the former, the courts may well determine that it would be objectively
reckless to ignore the patent in question. On the other hand, the
patentee in the second instance should not expect to prove the target
company was objectively reckless in a later litigation merely for
choosing to forego the expense associated with obtaining an opinion
of counsel. A "wait and see" approach in the latter case may well be a
reasonable one.
Another factor in determining whether to obtain an opinion is
when the accused infringer first learned of the patent in question.
Certainly, the court made it clear that there is no need to obtain an
opinion if the defendant first learned of the patent upon being sued.67
The court noted that in ordinary circumstances, willfulness will
depend on an infringer's pre-litigation conduct; a willfulness claim
asserted in the original complaint "must necessarily be grounded
exclusively in the accused infringer's pre-filing conduct., 68 A
defendant who first learned of the patent upon being sued could not
have engaged in pre-suit willful infringement by definition.69 Thus,
opinions obtained after litigation commenced "will likely be of little
significance.,
70
Ultimately, we may well see the law develop to the point that
opinions of counsel are simply not relevant in determining the issue
of willful infringement. After all, the point of opinions of counsel is to
67. Id. at *29-33.
68. Id. at *30.
69. Id.
70. Id. at *32. The court noted that a patentee who wishes to prove a defendant's post-
filing conduct is reckless should ordinarily move for a preliminary injunction. If the patentee is
unsuccessful, "it is likely the infringement did not rise to the level of recklessness.... A
substantial question about invalidity or infringement is likely sufficient not only to avoid a
preliminary injunction, but also a charge of willfulness based on post-filing conduct." Id. at *30-
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"provide an objective assessment for making informed business
decisions,"'" not to protect a company from a finding of willful
infringement. These business decisions typically include deciding
whether a company should introduce a new product to the
marketplace, or enter a new market altogether. The real value
provided by opinions of counsel is in analyzing the risks associated
with the making of such decisions vis-A-vis the patent rights of others;
indeed, most prudent and conscientious companies obtain opinions
for this very purpose. These companies should be allowed to rely on
such standard business practices to demonstrate their lack of objective
recklessness in any future patent litigation without requiring them to
waive the attorney-client privilege as to specific communications
regarding specific patents. Conversely, companies that have a "shoot
first, ask questions later" attitude should not be heard to complain if
their actions are later found to be objectively reckless.
Ultimately, eliminating the use of opinions of counsel in patent
litigation would be a welcome development. It would simplify the
case for both the parties and the court by removing the often complex
issues associated with determining the scope of any waiver. It would
also reduce the amount of discovery that would take place. The net
result would be a decrease in the cost of patent litigation for everyone
involved.
B. Can Opinion Counsel Also Be Trial Counsel?
The Seagate decision does not answer this question. As
explained above, the opinion counsel and trial counsel work product
in Seagate were separate and distinct. 72 This remains the preferred
course, as courts prior to Seagate, faced with facts showing that trial
counsel was also opinion counsel, have held that the waiver extends
to all communications the client had with that counsel concerning the
subject matter of the opinions, regardless of whether they were in the
context of discussing the litigation.
73
There are other concerns associated with having opinion counsel
also act as trial counsel. In most cases where the client asserts the
advice of counsel defense at trial, the attorney who prepared the
opinions will be a witness in the case. But ethical rules governing the
conduct of attorneys, such as The Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, prevent an attorney from acting as both an advocate and a
71. Id. at *27.
72. Id. at *7-8.
73. See Akeva L.L.C. v. Mizuno Corp., 243 F. Supp. 2d 418, 423 (M.D.N.C. 2003).
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witness in a case. 74 This results in the-likelihood that the attorney will
be disqualified from representing the client in the litigation.
Accordingly, the wiser choice for a company is to retain separate
opinion counsel and trial counsel.75
VI. CONCLUSION
The Seagate decision truly represents a "sea change" in the law
governing patent litigation. The Federal Circuit's holdings were
welcome, as they reconciled the standards for proving willful patent
infringement to other areas of the law, and upheld the importance of
the attorney-client privilege and work product immunity in patent
cases.
74. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.7(a) (2003):
A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a
necessary witness unless:
(1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue;
(2) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered
in the case; or
(3) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the
client.
75. This does not necessarily mean different law firms. Many companies use a single law
firm for opinion work and trial work, but use different attorneys for each role. This is expressly
permitted under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 3.7(b) (2003) ("A lawyer may act as advocate in a trial in which another lawyer in
the lawyer's firm is likely to be called as a witness unless precluded from doing so by Rule 1.7
or Rule 1.9.").
* * *
